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1 Introduction
We analyze whether the communication of European politicians with respect to the
sovereign debt crisis affects European stock and bond markets as well as the EUR-USD
exchange rate. For the August to December 2011 period we quantify all statements by
major European politicians that refer to the debt crisis and are reported by the news
agency Reuters. We then explain the changes in eight national stock and bond markets
in the 15 minutes following each statement by the content of the communication. The
empirical results show that the stock markets of the core European countries (Germany,
France and Belgium) as well as the periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain) instantaneously increase in response to positive communication regarding the
stance of the economy in the periphery countries or positive communication with respect
to the Eurozone (EZ) as a whole. In sharp contrast, the response of the national bond
markets is asymmetric, whereby mainly the Italian and German bond markets are af-
fected. While negative communication regarding the economic situation in Italy leads to
an immediate increase in 10-year Italian government bond yields, German government
bond yields decrease. This finding is in line with the view that financial market partic-
ipants consider the German bond market a safe haven and highlights that Italy plays
a pivotal role among the periphery countries. During our sample period, Silvio Berlus-
coni’s Italian government was under strong political pressure and finally had to resign
in November 2011. Moreover, our results show that political communication concern-
ing the periphery countries evokes stronger market reactions than statements on the EZ.
While statements that suggest an expansion of the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) or shared liability for national debts do not lead to decreasing bond yields in the
periphery countries, communication about the introduction of further austerity measures
does reduce Italian yields. Finally, positive communication leads to a significant but weak
appreciation of the EURO against the US dollar.
Our results extend upon and complement the recent work of Mohl and Sondermann
(2012) and Beetsma et al. (2012) on the effects of political communication on sovereign
bond spreads. Most importantly, while both studies employ daily data, we take a high-
frequency perspective. Using high-frequency data allows us to monitor the effects of po-
litical communication on financial markets in real time and bypass problems with respect
to identification and causality. In particular, we do not have to worry about potential
control variables.
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2 Data and Methodology
Our data set starts on August 01, 2011 and ends on December 06, 2011, i.e. it covers 92
trading days. We consider statements and the corresponding asset price changes lying
within the trading hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Central European Time (CET).
2.1 Quantifying statements by European policy makers
We search all news reports from Reuters for statements by the EZ’s 17 Heads of Govern-
ment, their respective Finance Ministers, and the four leading EU representatives – the
President of the EU Commission Jose´ Manuel Barroso, the President of the Euro Group
Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU Economics Commissioner Olli Rehn, and the President of
the European Council Herman Van Rompuy.
We separate the statements into two groups. In the first group, we collect all state-
ments that refer to the economic situation or austerity measures in the following periphery
countries: Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE) and Greece (GR). We code
each statement, CPt , as +1 if the statement implies a positive outlook for the specific
country or the introduction of new austerity measures, and as −1 otherwise.1 For exam-
ple, the Reuters report: “Italian PM Berlusconi says new agreement on austerity package
confirms solidity of ruling coalition” on August 30, 2011 at 12:44 is coded as CPt = +1.
The second group contains all statements that refer to the EZ as a whole, in particular
to the EFSF, Eurobonds, the role of the ECB or the EURO as a currency. We code
statements, CEZt , as +1 when they – broadly speaking – suggest a shared liability for na-
tional debts within the EZ, e.g., statements that support the introduction of Eurobonds
or the expansion of the EFSF. Statements with content opposed to such ideas are coded
as −1. For example, the Reuters report: “Germany’s Merkel says Eurobonds are abso-
lutely wrong” on September 15, 2011 at 10:47 is coded as CEZt = −1. We disregard all
statements that are either neutral or do not portray a clear message. Overall, Reuters
reported 778 statements of which 164 were unanimously quantifiable.
Table 1 provides a summary of the statements. Among the 164 statements, 77 (87)
refer to the periphery countries (the EZ as a whole). 101 (or 62%) of the statements are
coded as being positive (+1). Interestingly, for the EZ positive and negative statements
1This approach of coding statements is commonly referred to as Content Analysis and has been used
by, among others, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) and Conrad and Lamla (2010) for analyzing the effects
of central bank communication.
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are almost balanced. On the contrary, 75% of the statements referring to the periphery
countries are positive. Since these countries are at the center of the debt crisis, the high
number of positive statements might be surprising at first sight. However, this can be
explained by the fact that a large share of these statements refers to the introduction
of new austerity measures. Finally, among the statements that refer to the periphery
countries the majority are related to Italy (37) and Greece (28). This reflects the fact
that during our sample period the political debate was very much focused on these two
countries. In contrast, Spain was not yet under such scrutiny.
Table 1: Summary of Political Statements
Positive Negative Total
Periphery (CPt ) IT 24 65% 13 35% 37
GR 23 82% 5 18% 28
ES 4 100% 0 0% 4
IE 4 100% 0 0% 4
PT 3 100% 0 0% 3
Total 58 75% 19 25% 77
Eurozone (CEZt ) 43 49% 44 51% 87
Total 101 62% 63 38% 164
Notes: The table shows the number and the tone (positive/negative) of the
statements that refer to the periphery countries and the EZ, respectively.
2.2 Financial Data
For the stock market indices of three core EZ countries (DAX (Germany), CAC (France),
BEL20 (Belgium)) and the five periphery countries (FTSE MIB (Italy), IBEX (Spain),
PSI20 (Portugal), ISEQ (Ireland) and ASE (Greece)), we calculate 15-minute returns as
rt,t+15 = 100 × (ln(Pt+15) − ln(Pt)). Similarly, we calculate the 15-minute change in the
10-year government bond yields of the respective countries, denoted by it,t+15. Finally,
we consider the returns, ext,t+15, on the EUR-USD exchange rate. All financial data were
obtained from Bloomberg.
2.3 Econometric Methodology
In order to measure the high-frequency response of the European capital markets to po-
litical communication, we follow Almeida et al. (1998) and regress the 15-minute change
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in the respective financial market, yt,t+15 ∈ {rt,t+15, it,t+15, ext,t+15}, on the political com-
munication Ct ∈ {C
P
t , C
EZ
t }:
yt,t+15 = β0 + β1Ct + εt,t+15 (1)
Note that equation (1) is not a time series regression. Instead, each observation reflects
the respective capital market’s 15-minute adjustment in response to the preceding com-
munication.
3 Empirical Results
Table 2 provides a summary of the empirical results. Panel A shows how the national
stock markets respond to communication regarding i) the periphery countries, CPt , and
ii) the EZ, CEZt . First, all stock markets significantly increase in response to positive
communication regarding the periphery countries. The size of the response is strongest in
Germany and Italy with an R2 of 0.32 and 0.29, respectively. The R2 for Portugal, Ireland
and Greece are considerably lower. Second, statements in favor of a shared liability for
national debts within the EZ lead to significantly positive returns in all stock markets
except Greece. Note that in all stock markets the response to CEZt is weaker than the
response to CPt .
Panel B presents how political communication impacts on European bond markets.
In general, the R2’s in the bond market regressions are lower than the corresponding ones
in Panel A. We observe significant reactions to communication concerning the periphery
countries in the German, French and Italian bond markets only.2 The sign of the response
of the German and French bond markets is positive, while the sign of the response of the
Italian bond market is negative. More precisely, bad news regarding future economic
development in one of the periphery countries leads to a rise in the 10-year Italian gov-
ernment bond yield by 0.85 basis points while the German yield decreases by 0.69 basis
points. This bond market response is in line with the interpretation that financial market
participants view the German bond market as a safe haven. The fact that Italy is the only
periphery country for which we observe a significant market response may be explained by
the observation that due to its financial and political situation, the country was under the
spotlight in financial markets during our sample period. In comparison to Greece, Ireland,
2Since Bloomberg reported the 10-year Irish government bond yields until October 11, 2011 only, the
corresponding regressions are based on a shorter time period and, hence, include only 36/53 observations.
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and Portugal, the Italian debt level has been too high to allow the country to be taken
under the European rescue umbrella. Therefore, Italy’s debt problem was considered to
be the crucial issue in solving the European debt crisis. Since Italy plays such a pivotal
role, we analyze the response in capital markets to communication with respect to Italy
in more detail in Table 3. The result that the 10-year Greek government bond yields do
not react to statements regarding the periphery countries (although a large amount of
these statements refer specifically to Greece, see Table 1) may be explained by financial
market participants who do not consider the rescue measures taken as being sufficient to
solve the Greek debt problem.
Interestingly, only the German bond market significantly reacts to communication
regarding the EFSF, Eurobonds, the ECB or the EURO. Statements that are in favor
of an expansion of the EFSF, for example, lead to rising German bond yields. The
finding that the periphery countries’ government bond yields do not react at all to such
statements is remarkable. It implies that the periphery countries do not ‘benefit’ from
such statements.
As Panel C shows, political communication has a weak but significant influence on the
EUR-USD exchange rate. Positive communication leads to a significant appreciation of
the EURO within the 15 minutes following the statement.
Finally, Table 3 presents how financial markets respond to communication regarding
Italy, CIt . Recall that 37 out of the 77 statements regarding the periphery countries
are concerned with Italy. In comparison to Table 2, the estimated coefficients typically
suggest a stronger market response and a higher R2. Unsurprisingly, the Italian stock
market reacts most strongly to positive communication about Italy. More precisely, after
a positive statement the FTSE MIB increases on average by 0.29% in the ensuing 15
minutes. In addition to the German, French and Italian bond markets, the Spanish
bond market now shows a significant (at the 10% level) reaction as well. In response
to positive communication the government bond yields of the core (periphery) countries
increase (decline). For example, if a major European politician communicates that Italy
will introduce new austerity measures, the Italian government bond yield decreases by
1.49 basis points. Overall, our results highlight the pivotal role that Italy plays among
the periphery countries and confirm the safe haven interpretation of the German bond
market. Finally, the EUR-USD exchange rate also reacts more strongly to communication
concerning Italy.
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Table 2: Financial Market Response to Political Communication
Core Countries Periphery Countries
Ct # of Obs. DE FR BE IT ES PT IE GR
Panel A: Stock Markets (dependent variable: rt,t+15, change in %)
DAX CAC Bel20 FTSE MIB IBEX PSI20 ISEQ ASE1
CPt 77 0.2282*** 0.2160*** 0.1630*** 0.2307*** 0.1785*** 0.1167*** 0.0923*** 0.1120**
(0.0357) (0.0428) (0.0329) (0.0470) (0.0398) (0.0275) (0.0334) (0.0472)
R2 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.06
CEZt 87 0.1784*** 0.1478*** 0.0930*** 0.1537*** 0.1321*** 0.0889*** 0.0735*** -0.0050
(0.0273) (0.0240) (0.0225) (0.0323) (0.0268) (0.0255) (0.0233) (0.0546)
R2 0.33 0.31 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.00
Panel B: Bond Markets (dependent variable: it,t+15, change in basis points)
10-year government bonds2
CPt 77 0.6929*** 0.3608** 1.4409 -0.8470*** -0.1863 0.1151 8.2820 -1.1924
(0.1523) (0.1731) (1.0245) (0.2289) (0.1867) (0.1552) (8.6568) (0.8722)
R2 0.25 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01
CEZt 87 0.2376** 0.1623 -0.5044 -0.0761 -0.1829 -0.2773 -1.4056 0.3810
(0.1110) (0.1247) (0.8002) (0.1605) (0.1672) (0.3229) (4.0341) (0.7649)
R2 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Exchange Rate (dependent variable: ext,t+15, change in %)
EUR/USD
CPt 77 0.0563***
(0.0123)
R2 0.21
CEZt 87 0.0322***
(0.0082)
R2 0.15
Notes: The table presents the estimates of β1 in equation (1). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
1Due to the Greek trading hours (930 - 1600 CET), the Greek stock market regressions are based
on 67/71 statements respectively. 2Since Bloomberg reported the yields on 10-year Irish government
bonds until October 11, 2011 only, the corresponding regressions are based on 36/53 statements.
7
Table 3: Financial Market Response to Statements Regarding Italy
Core Countries Periphery Countries
Ct # of Obs. DE FR BE IT ES PT IE GR
Panel A: Stock Markets (dependent variable: rt,t+15, change in %)
DAX CAC Bel20 FTSE MIB IBEX PSI20 ISEQ ASE1
CIt 37 0.2361*** 0.2485*** 0.2007*** 0.2857*** 0.2125*** 0.1155*** 0.1403*** 0.0897
(0.0445) (0.0572) (0.0404) (0.0609) (0.0540) (0.0307) (0.0305) (0.0815)
R2 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.03
Panel B: Bond Markets (dependent variable: it,t+15, change in basis points)
10-year government bonds2
CIt 37 0.9595*** 0.5702** 2.0974 -1.4918*** -0.4827* 0.4237 20.8583 -0.5587
(0.1992) (0.2195) (1.4842) (0.3325) (0.2580) (0.3373) (19.0324) (1.0818)
R2 0.44 0.16 0.09 0.30 0.08 0.02 0.26 0.01
Panel C: Exchange Rate (dependent variable: ext,t+15, change in %)
EUR/USD
CIt 37 0.0698***
(0.0159)
R2 0.38
Notes: The table presents the estimates of β1 in the regression yt+15 = β0 + β1CIt + εt,t+15,
where yt,t+15 ∈ {rt,t+15, it,t+15, ext,t+15}. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 1The
Greek stock market regression is based on 28 statements. 2Since Bloomberg reported the yields on
10-year Irish government bonds until October 11, 2011 only, the corresponding regressions are based
is 11 statements.
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4 Conclusion
Our results show that the communication of major European politicians during the
sovereign debt crisis has a significant impact on the European financial markets. We find
that statements regarding specific periphery countries evoke stronger market responses
than statements focused on the EZ as a whole. While positive statements of either type
lead to significant increases in the stock markets of all countries under analysis, only the
German, French and Italian bond markets are affected by political communication. The
bond market reactions imply that investors consider the German governments bonds to
be a safe haven. Italian government bond yields decrease if political communication hints
at improvements in the state of the economy or the introduction of new austerity mea-
sures, but they do not react to statements in favor of an expansion of the EFSF or the
introduction of Eurobonds.
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